Could Log-ons by Anonymizers and Proxies Be Blocked by Sim?

[Prokofy Neva]

I don't know if the move "the the cloud" would make it easier or harder to accomplish this mission.

I don't know if this mission is in the browser or server side or where.

Currently, we have the option to check off on land -- in the browser essentially -- the option "No Payment on File" or "Payment Information of File" or "Age Verified."

I personally don't use any of those myself or in rentals because it needlessly causes havoc -- most people have a mixture of these contacts and I see no reason to cut off good customers.

People have individual preferences and needs for their club or business to have a different set of blocks -- that's fine.

What I also wonder about technically is the blocking of log-ons by proxies and anonymizers. Whatever their value for some purposes that Linden Lab wants to enhance, let's say using SL from countries that censor the Internet or for protection of vulnerable populations of people such as transgender or refugee or victims of domestic violence, or for enterprises such as journalism or training that might require it, for some of us the brunt of the use-cases are griefers, day-old alts repeating, copyright violators, and so on. Not Iranian freedom fighters, people who need safety, and police training.

Second Life is not Tor. Second Life is Amazon and Facebook in the round, with Tor use cases only tacked on.

A check off box on land parcel or sim that you will not accept avatars with that status -- using rogue viewers, using log-ons to strip away their ID or enable the appearance "as new" so they can keep making new alts -- this would be a boon.

And I can't see now why the principle would be any different -- log-on status should be a table or a function that in a program is no different than payment status or age. But perhaps not.

Perhaps it's too dynamic. But every server knows how you logged on, and with what. It might require then having a table of known proxies and anonymizers to block as you would malware, and I realize that becomes an ideological issue for Lindens if not technical.

So first I want to find out what the technical specifications are of this job -- too hard because dynamic, too political because of list needed to be devised, too hard and a strain on servers with too many calls on them to look this up -- just the facts there.

 

Edited February 3, 2018 by Prokofy Neva

[Whirly Fizzle]

I don't this this is workable.
Griff viewers can spoof IP, Mac Address & which viewer build they are logging in on.

Edited February 3, 2018 by Whirly Fizzle
typo

[Prokofy Neva]

Yes, I know. That's another question. They do that, it becomes hard, but PS, the Lindens can and do bans on these bases.

What do you think of the question I actually asked, only the issue of proxy addresses or the use of anonymizing programs. Those are recognizable like any thing on the Internet.

The question isn't "can griefers override what you're thinking of by IP spoofing". The question is: can a list of anonymizer or proxy addresses be blocked by sim.

[Callum Meriman]

Leaving out ID0... and just addressing blocking proxies, it's a bit of whack-a-mole Prok.

It takes just a few pennies to spin up a proxy on Digital Ocean for the day (well US$10 a month if you run it all month) and the "IP" address of the proxy can be changed without cost at the drop of a hat.

No sense blocking only Digital ocean's huge range of IP addresses, then there are Amazons, Microsofts, Googles, Rackspace's, ...... it goes on.

[Whirly Fizzle]

7 hours ago, Prokofy Neva said:

The question is: can a list of anonymizer or proxy addresses be blocked by sim.

Technically, it should be possible to implement.